vulnerability / NVI-00018462 / Revision 1
nono: Sandbox escape on Linux via D-Bus: `systemd-run --user`
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nono-cli. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.1 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
nono-cli
source listed< 0.55.0
### Summary The nono Landlock/seccomp policies allow access to local Unix domain sockets (concrete and abstract). This allows an easy sandbox escape by talking to the per-user systemd dbus socket. Threat scenario: Running Aider, Claude Code, OpenCode or similar tools with "allow bash" policy so that it can invoke arbitrary host tools like `make`, `gcc`, etc. to write code. ### Reproducer Here, instead of running a tool like `opencode` or `claude` one can just invoke `systemd-run`, but this is something an agent could be tricked into doing: ```bash $ cd ~/src/myproject $ nono run -s --allow-cwd --profile claude-code -- \ systemd-run --user -q --wait --collect \ /bin/sh -c "echo oops > ~/Documents/escaped.txt" $ cat /var/home/test/Documents/escaped.txt oops $ ``` ### Impact Complete sandbox escape. The unsandboxed sibling process can write anywhere the user can write, spawn arbitrary processes with network access, etc. ### Maintainer Context This issue allows a process running inside the sandbox to escape confinement by interacting with local user-scoped IPC mechanisms and regain the authority already held by the invoking user or service account. The issue impac
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-27vp-2mmc-vmh3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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