vulnerability / NVI-00018650 / Revision 1
skillctl: Path traversal and symlink-follow in skillctl allow arbitrary file disclosure and deletion
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for skillctl. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
skillctl
source listed< 0.1.2
## Impact `skillctl` 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 contained four path-safety vulnerabilities that, in combination, allowed an attacker to: 1. **Exfiltrate arbitrary files on the operator's machine** by publishing a malicious skills library containing a symlink inside a skill folder (e.g. `niania → /home/user/.aws/credentials`). The symlink fell through `entry.file_type().is_dir()` in `fs_util::copy_dir_all`, was dereferenced by `fs::copy`, and the target's content was copied into the project. A subsequent `skillctl push` would have published the secret to the (possibly public) library — what the reporter called "round-trip path exfiltration". 2. **Delete arbitrary directories outside the project or library root** by crafting a `.skills.toml` with a malicious `destination` or `source_path` field. Both were deserialized as `PathBuf` with zero validation. Because `Path::join` lets an absolute right-hand side replace the base, `destination = "/home/user/.ssh"` made `cwd.join(...)` resolve outside the project; `..` traversal was equally unguarded. Downstream `remove_dir_all` in `replace_folder_contents` then wiped arbitrary writable directories on `skillctl pull` / `push` / `detect`. `.skills.tom
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.